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This paper presents evidence on gender segregation in employment contracts in 15 EU 
countries, using micro data from the ECHPS.  Women are over-represented in part-time jobs 
in all countries considered, but while in northern Europe such allocation roughly reflects 
women’s preferences and their need to combine work with child care, in southern Europe 
part-time jobs are often involuntary and provide significantly lower job satisfaction than full-
time ones.  Women are also over-represented in fixed-term contracts in southern Europe, and 
again this job allocation cannot be explained by preferences or productivity differentials 
between the two genders.  There is thus a largely unexplained residual in the gender job 
allocation, which may be consistent with some degree of discrimination in a few of the labour 
markets considered, especially in southern Europe.  
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ISBN 0 7530 1763 6 1.  Introduction 
 
Alongside clear successes in the recent labor market experiences of women like employment 
gains and narrowing wage differentials (Blau and Kahn 2003), there is evidence of some 
occupational, sectoral and job segregation still remaining, potentially resulting into an under-
utilization of women’s skills and gender discrimination (OECD 2002, chapter 2). While 
occupational segregation has already received some attention in the economic literature,
1 less 
is known on systematic differences in the types of employment contracts held by the two 
genders across occupations and sectors of the economy.  
The recent empirical literature has often emphasized the spectacular growth of “non-
standard” or “atypical” jobs during the past few decades both in Europe and in the US, 
typically including part-time jobs and temporary/casual jobs (see OECD 1999, chapter 1, and 
the June 2002 Issue of the Economic Journal on Temporary Work for an overview). A key 
factor to understand recent labor market developments lies therefore in the study of the 
incidence and the characteristics of non-standard forms of work. At its best, part-time work 
may provide an opportunity for flexible hours of work, and for combining wage work with 
family commitments, especially for women. However, some cases of part-time work might 
as well be considered as a form of underemployment, paying lower wages and providing 
inferior fringe benefits than full-time work (see OECD 1999, chapter 1). Similarly, 
temporary contracts may provide firms with a useful mean of worker screening, and therefore 
                                                 
1The main findings in Dolado et al. (2002) international study on gender occupational segregation are: (i) higher 
occupational segregation in the EU than the US, mainly due to a lower share of women in managerial and 
professional jobs; (ii) strong positive correlation between occupational segregation and the share of part-time 
jobs; and (iii) a weaker positive correlation the unexplained part of the gender pay gap and the share of women 
across occupations. See also references therein. 
  1represent stepping-stones towards permanent employment. Alternatively, they may simply 
end up being used as a cheaper option to adjust firm-level employment, with lower wages 
and severance payments, and poor human capital accumulation (see Booth et al. 2002 and 
Arulampalan et al. 2003). 
As the incidence of non-standard forms of employment may differ across genders, as 
well as their associated penalty for wages and other job characteristics, systematic features of 
these contracts may be an important factor of gender discrimination in the labor market. In 
this paper I examine whether coeteris paribus women in Europe are more likely than men to 
be segregated in atypical jobs, namely part-time or temporary jobs,
2 whether these jobs carry 
a penalty for job satisfaction, and whether segregation can be interpreted as a source of 
gender discrimination.  
Labour market discrimination is commonly understood as the residual difference in 
labour market outcomes that cannot be explained by factors such as preferences or human 
capital endowments of different categories of workers (Altonji and Blank, 1999). Studies on 
gender discrimination have typically addressed the question of wage discrimination, namely 
what fraction of the gender wage differential cannot be explained by differences in skills or 
in their labour market price. Discrimination through job segregation is another form of 
discrimination, which may also lead to wage gaps, if the jobs to which women are segregated 
are lower-paying ones.  
Of course, job segregation can arise for reasons others than discrimination. First, men 
and women may differ in their human capital and productivity in non-market activities, 
potentially leading to differences in comparative advantages across jobs. Second, their 
preferences for the characteristics of jobs may also differ. The residual from these two 
                                                 
2 In what follows, the terms “job” and “contract” will be used interchangeably. 
  2explanations would be consistent with employer discrimination against women, which, if 
any, may be more severe in some types of jobs rather than others.  
A major issue is the source of differences in human capital and job preferences across 
genders. Investment in women’s human capital may be discouraged by the expectation of 
future labour market discrimination and by pre-labour market discrimination in the quality 
and quantity of schooling (Thomas 1990). Also, women’s preferences for certain types of 
jobs – typically part-time jobs – may be driven by social norms (Akerlof and Kranton 2000) 
or the impossibility to delegate home production. While it would be difficult to quantify 
these effects, the potential endogeneity of human capital investments and preferences with 
respect to gender discrimination would imply that the portion of job segregation that cannot 
be explained by differences in human capital or preferences provides a lower bound for the 
extent of gender discrimination in the labour market.  
Although I do not perform a direct test on gender discrimination, I will argue that 
there is a largely unexplained residual in the gender job allocation and in the estimated wage 
differentials by gender and type of job, which may be consistent with some degree of 
discrimination in some of the labor markets considered, especially in southern Europe. These 
results on gender differences in working arrangements across Europe compare in an 
interesting way with those of Pissarides et al. (2003, chapter 5) and of Azmat et al. (2003) on 
other aspects of the gender gap, namely in wages and unemployment rates respectively. 
Pissarides et al. estimate that, having controlled for non-random selection of women in the 
labor force, the gender pay gap in Spain and Greece is as large as in the UK, despite the fact 
that Mediterranean countries typically have lower overall wage inequality than Anglo-Saxon 
countries. Azmat et al. find evidence of a significant residual in the gender unemployment 
gap in southern Europe, which is not explained by observable characteristics or different 
  3attitudes towards job search of the two genders, but which is nevertheless correlated with 
attitudes on whether men are more deserving of work than women. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes my data set. Section 3 
documents the extent of job segregation in Europe by characterizing those categories of 
workers who are more likely to hold atypical jobs, with emphasis on gender and family 
composition effects. Section 4 aims to determine to what extent actual contract arrangements 
are mainly driven by employer choices as opposed to men and women preferences for more 
flexible forms of employment, by looking at job satisfaction indexes. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The Data 
 
I use data from the European Community Household Panel Survey, whose coverage is 
currently on 15 EU member states, during six annual waves (1994-1999). This is an 
unbalanced household-based panel survey, containing annual information on a few thousands 
households per country.
3 The Employment section of the survey contains information on the 
type of jobs held by members of the selected households, including working hours and type 
of contract. Several indices of job satisfaction are also reported, either overall satisfaction or 
satisfaction with specific job attributes, namely the quality of jobs, working hours, job 
security and earnings. 
                                                 
3 The initial sample sizes are as follows. Austria: 3,380; Belgium: 3490; Denmark: 3,482; Finland: 4,139; 
France: 7,344; Germany: 11,175; Greece: 5,523; Ireland: 4,048; Italy: 7,115; Luxembourg: 1,011; Netherlands: 
5,187; Portugal: 4,881; Spain: 7,206; Sweden: 5,891; U.K.: 10,905. These figures are the number of household 
included in the first wave for each country, which corresponds to 1995 for Austria, 1996 for Finland, 1997 for 
Sweden, and 1994 for all other countries. 
  4For the purposes of this analysis I select all employees aged 16-64 with non missing 
information on the type of employment contract held. Table 1 reports some summary 
statistics on the distribution of atypical employment contracts across genders.  
To obtain data on part-time work, I use information on the number of hours 
(including paid overtime) that individuals work weekly in their main job, and I define as part-
timers those working less than 30 hours. As shown in Table 1, the incidence of part-time is 
much higher among women than among men. Except in Ireland, part-time incidence among 
men is everywhere below 5%, while for women it goes from about 9% in Portugal and 
Finland to 45% in the Netherlands. On average, more women work part-time in central and 
northern Europe than in the south, while no major geographical pattern can be detected for 
men.  
I next present figures on involuntary part time, including all workers who declare to 
hold a part-time job because they wanted but could not find a full-time one. When one takes 
into account the reason why men and women work part-time, a negative cross-country 
correlation between the use of part-time work and the incidence of involuntary part-time can 
be detected. In particular, in northern and central Europe part-time work is less likely to be 
perceived as involuntary than in the south, especially by women. Finland makes an exception 
to this general rule, behaving more closely to southern than northern European countries. 
I finally present data on temporary work, defined as work covered by either a fixed-
term contract or no contract at all. The incidence of temporary work varies more across 
countries than across genders. In all countries considered except Spain, Portugal and Greece, 
on average slightly less than 10% of employed men hold temporary jobs. This proportion 
however rises to one fifth in Portugal and Greece, and to over one third in Spain. The 
relevant figures for women are slightly higher, but replicate quite closely this international 
pattern. 
  5The ECHPS does not provide information on the reason why individuals hold 
temporary jobs, although it may be argued that most cases of temporary employment are 
indeed involuntary, as a permanent contract would be at least as good as a temporary contract 
from a worker perspective. Aggregate data published by Eurostat however provide 
information on the proportion of temporary employees who wanted but could not find a 
permanent job.
4 For both men and women, countries like Finland, Belgium, Spain and 
Greece have about three quarters of involuntary temporary jobs. For the rest of countries this 
proportion is substantially lower. Germany seems to be the best performing country, with 
only 17% and 21% of involuntary temporary work among men and women, respectively. 
 
3. The Incidence of Atypical Jobs 
 
I next use multivariate analysis to look at how women perform relatively to men in their 
employment characteristics by estimating binary choice models for a number of job 
attributes. I estimate probit models for the probabilities of working part-time, being an 
involuntary part-time worker, and holding a fixed-term contract, controlling for a number of 
individual and job characteristics.  
All estimated equations include age and education effects, occupation, sector and year 
dummies, and control for the family composition of workers and previous unemployment 
spells. The effect of family characteristics is allowed to differ across genders, to pick up the 
component of employment arrangements that may be explained by the different family 
commitments of the two genders. The existence of an unemployment spell just prior to the 
current job is also controlled for, as women may experience more frequent non-employment 
                                                 
4 Note that the selection criteria for Eurostat data are slightly different than the one used for the ECHPS sample. 
In particular, Eurostat data are for 1999 only and refer to employees aged 25-49. 
  6spells than men, and atypical contracts may be used as a first stepping stone from non-
employment into regular employment. Existing evidence for the US indeed shows that 
atypical employment arrangements (including part-time jobs or fixed-term contracts) tend to 
be held disproportionately more by those who have suffered a job loss or had spells of 
inactivity, due to the difficulty in finding regular employment (Farber 1999). Related to this, 
evidence for Europe suggests that the share of temporary contracts is much higher in the 
inflow of newly-created jobs than in the existing stock (see Blanchard and Landier 2002 for 
France and Dolado et al. 2002 and Güell and Petrongolo 2003 for Spain). 
One way to effectively summarize these estimates consists in using the marginal 
effects from probit models to compute the difference in the predicted probabilities of 
alternative working arrangements for women and men belonging to a number of 
demographic groups. The groups are: single individuals without kids, married individuals 
without kids, and married individuals with small kids (at least one aged 0-2 and at least one 
aged 3-5). Clearly such categories do not represent the whole population of employees, but 
they are chosen to illustrate in a parsimonious way the effect of family ties on the incidence 
of different forms of work in male and female employment. 
The resulting gender differences are reported in Table 2. The interpretation of the 
figures reported is as follows. For example, the top left number in Table 2 indicates that in 
the U.K. single women without kids are 5.5% more likely than single men without kids to 
hold a part-time job, and this difference is statistically different from zero at the 1% 
significance level. The gender difference rises to 23.5% for those married without kids, and 
to 50.1% for those married with small kids.  
The first set of results presented in Table 2 shows that in all countries considered 
women are over-represented in part-time jobs. Among single individuals without kids, 
gender differences range from 1.5% in Finland to 9.1% in the Netherlands. Such gender 
  7differences rise substantially for those married without kids (above 20% in a number of 
northern European countries, and 45% in the Netherlands) and even more for those married 
with kids (again the Netherlands are an outlier here, with a gender difference in predicted 
probabilities of working part-time of nearly 80%). Overall, the cross-country variation of 
gender differences is relatively small for workers without family ties, and rises substantially 
when married workers are considered, especially if they have young kids. In other words, the 
high incidence of part-time jobs among north-European women documented in Table 1 is 
largely explained by the presence of family ties. Single women without kids work relatively 
more similar hours across Europe than those married and/or with small kids.  
To address this point more specifically, we can take the gender differential in the 
incidence of part-time work for those married with kids as the total to be explained by (i) 
gender, (ii) marital status and (iii) presence of kids. The importance of gender alone (i.e. the 
ratio between the figure reported in the first row and the corresponding one in the third row) 
is 5% in Luxembourg, around 10% in U.K. and the Netherlands, and in the range 15-30% or 
so in all other countries down to Ireland. But it rises to 35% in France and Italy, 54% in 
Spain and 80% in Portugal. While there is no clear international pattern in the explanatory 
power of marital status, the presence of small kids explains more than 40% of the gender 
difference in the incidence of part-time work in the U.K., Sweden, the Netherlands, and more 
than one third in other northern or central European countries, while it drops below 30% in 
Spain and Greece, to zero in France and Italy, and goes actually negative in Portugal. It 
should nevertheless be mentioned however that this figure is also particularly small for non-
Mediterranean countries such as Denmark, Germany and Belgium. 
The use of part-time work for combining paid work and family or other commitments 
should be associated with a lower incidence of involuntary part-time, due to the lack of full-
time jobs available, rather than the need or the desire to work shorter hours. We would 
  8therefore expect that in countries where family ties explain most of part-time incidence 
among women, women are less likely to consider themselves involuntary part-timers. 
The second panel of Table 2 provides estimates of gender differentials in predicted 
probabilities of being an involuntary part-timer, conditional on working part-time. Among 
single women, part-time is more likely to be involuntary than among single men in the UK, 
France, Italy, Portugal and Greece. In particular, while this difference is around 3% in the 
UK, it increases to 7% in Italy, 13% in Portugal and Greece and nearly 20% in France. The 
only country in which single women are significantly less likely to be constrained in the 
number of hours worked than single men is Ireland.  
Among married individuals with kids the gender differential in the probability of 
being an involuntary part-timer goes negative in most countries except Finland, the 
Netherlands, Italy and Greece, where it is non-significant, and in Portugal, where it is 
positive and significant.  
The picture that emerges from the estimates of the two part-time equations can be 
summarized by saying that in northern and central Europe, part-time among women is to a 
large extent explained by family ties (especially the presence of very young kids) and it is 
unlikely to be perceived as the consequence of a market constraint on the number of working 
hours. On the contrary, in southern European countries (including France) the explanatory 
power of family ties in female part-time employment is lower, and single women are more 
likely to be involuntary part-timers than single men. These facts are much easier to reconcile 
with discrimination against women in regular, full-time jobs than with gender differences in 
preferences or comparative advantages.  
The last set of results concerns the incidence of temporary work across genders, based 
on the same specification of the regression equation as for part-time work. Temporary work 
is more frequent among single women than single men in Sweden, Finland, Belgium, Austria 
  9and southern Europe. The highest differential effect is found for Spain, at 5.5%, being also 
the country with the highest overall incidence of temporary work. Being married reinforces 
this tendency, as the presence of extra family income may make women more willing to 
accept temporary, less secure jobs. The highest gender difference is detected for Ireland, 
where married women without kids are about 14% more likely than married men to hold a 
temporary contract, followed by Spain, with a differential effect of 10%. Among workers 
with kids, significant gender differences are only detected for Belgium and Ireland. This 
result bears no clear interpretation in terms of family commitments of women, unless part-
time jobs are typically covered by temporary contracts. 
I therefore explicitly consider the possibility that the use of temporary and part-time 
contracts be positively correlated across individuals. It can in fact be argued that temporary 
contracts are used relatively more to cover part-time rather than full-time jobs, and viceversa. 
Indeed this is what is found in my data set. A simple cross-country probit regression of the 
probability of holding a temporary contract on a set of country dummies and a part-time 
dummy reveals that part-time workers are 12% more likely than full-time workers to hold a 
fixed-term contract and this effect bears a t-statistic of 55.4. Lack of control for such 
correlation may bias the coefficients of interest as, for instance, one might obtain a 
significant gender effect in the fixed-term contract equation simply because women are more 
likely to work shorter hours and part-time jobs are mostly covered by fixed-term contracts. I 
therefore estimated the part-time and the fixed-term contract equations simultaneously using 
a bivariate probit model. The estimated covariance between the error terms of the two 
equations was positive and significant at the 5% level for all countries considered (except 
Luxembourg, where it was only significant at the 10% level). Nevertheless, the sign and the 
significance of the gender and family variables remained largely unchanged from the 
specifications in which such covariance is not acknowledged.   
  10I run a number of other robustness tests on the estimates of my probit equations for 
employment arrangements. First, I included interactions between gender and education 
controls, to account for different returns to human capital for the two genders. Second, I 
removed job controls, possibly endogenous to the choice of contract. Third, considering that 
female labor force participation widely differs across the set of countries considered, I run 
ordered probit equations that include non-employment as an alternative to full-time and part-
time work, and to permanent and temporary work, respectively. The results reported here 
were largely robust to these specification checks. 
 
4. Job Satisfaction on Atypical Jobs. 
 
Section 2 illustrates that, controlling for a number of individual and job characteristics, 
women tend to take the larger share of part-time jobs in all countries considered, and of 
temporary jobs in a smaller subset of countries. An unequal allocation of genders across jobs 
may stem from productivity differentials, preferences, or employer discrimination. The 
estimates of the previous section control for comparative advantages by conditioning 
outcomes on human capital and family characteristics, whose effect on employment 
arrangements is allowed to differ across genders. In this section I address the issue of 
workers preferences. 
If the observed job allocation meets the preferences of the workers affected (and does 
not negatively affect their productivity) then one should conclude that workers sort 
themselves efficiently across jobs. However, we have seen in the previous section that some 
fraction of female part-time work is indeed involuntary, as a full-time job would have been 
preferred to a part-time one but was not found. And aggregate Eurostat data give an even 
stronger picture for temporary work (see Table 1).  
  11In this section I use job satisfaction indicators to infer how worker utility is affected 
when holding an atypical job. The ECHPS contains detailed information on specific 
dimensions of job satisfaction (overall job satisfaction, satisfaction with earnings, job 
security, type of job, working hours, etc.). Each aspect of job satisfaction is measured on a 
scale from 1 to 5, from very dissatisfied to very satisfied, and corresponding ordered probit 
equations are estimated, including the usual individual and job characteristics on the right-
hand side, plus a part-time and a temporary contract control, each interacted with gender. The 
results are reported in Table 3.  
A clear message from the first three panels of Table 3 is that part-time jobs tend to 
reduce job satisfaction (overall and with earnings) in southern Europe only (and they actually 
increase it in some northern European countries), while temporary jobs reduce satisfaction 
(overall, with earnings and with the type of job) everywhere, but more so in the South than in 
the North. If anything, the negative effect of holding an atypical contract on satisfaction with 
earnings is mitigated for women in a few cases. 
Features which are most closely related to part-time or temporary jobs, like 
satisfaction with working hours and job security, are studied in panels 4 and 5 respectively. 
Concerning working hours, female part-timers in northern Europe are typically more satisfied 
than male part-timers with shorter working hours, while this only happens in a subset of 
southern European countries, namely Spain and Greece. As expected, holding a temporary 
job implies lower satisfaction with job security in all countries considered (and again this 
effect is stronger in southern Europe), and women are in this case even more negatively 
affected than males.  
The results of this section can be very broadly summarized saying that, as far as job 
satisfaction is concerned, part-time jobs are generally perceived as good as full-time jobs in 
central and northern Europe, and even better than full-time jobs by women in a few cases. On 
  12the contrary, in southern Europe they tend to be perceived as inferior. Temporary jobs reduce 
job satisfaction everywhere, if anything more in the south than in the north. This result is 
interesting in the light of the recent experiments of flexibility at the margin, implemented in a 
number of European countries through the introduction of temporary contracts.
5 Increased 
labor market flexibility does not seem to have come without a cost in terms of job 
satisfaction, especially as far as job security is concerned. 
Furthermore, women’s job satisfaction is in a few cases less affected by atypical 
contracts (when it comes to earnings and working hours, and mostly in northern Europe), and 
in others more affected (typically when it comes to job security). Overall, there is no 
widespread evidence that women are systematically happier (or less unhappy) than men on 
atypical jobs, which means that different gender preferences for work arrangements cannot 
go a long way in explaining women’s over-representation in atypical jobs. 
 
5. Conclusions  
 
This paper has provided detailed evidence on gender job segregation in Europe using data 
from the ECHPS. Two main results have emerged from this analysis. First, so called atypical 
jobs such as part-time and temporary jobs display systematic features that make them 
significantly different from typical jobs. In particular, part-time jobs are dominated by full-
time ones in terms of job satisfaction in southern Europe, and temporary jobs are dominated 
                                                 
5 During the 1990s, temporary employment growth accounted for around a half of total employment growth in 
Finland, France, Spain and Portugal, and was actually higher than total employment growth in Germany and 
Italy (see OECD 2002, chapter 3) – all countries with relatively strict employment protection on permanent 
contracts (see OECD 1999, chapter 2). 
  13virtually everywhere by permanent jobs, but differences are more marked for southern 
European countries. 
Second, given than women are over-represented in such atypical jobs in most 
countries considered, systematic features of these jobs may be an important factor of gender 
discrimination. In particular, I argue that the extent of existing job segregation may be 
consistent with some underlying gender discrimination in southern Europe, as it is not fully 
explained by different preferences or productivities of the two genders. By contrast, in 
central and northern Europe, atypical work is either less widespread (as in the case of 
temporary work), or seems to better mirror women’s preferences for shorter working hours 
(as in the case of part-time work) and thus should not be perceived as a signal of gender 
discrimination in the labor market.  
An interesting related question is how women in southern Europe may achieve the 
desired flexibility in working hours, in order to combine paid work and home production, as 
we have seen that on average 15% of female employees hold part-time jobs in Italy, Spain, 
Portugal and Greece, against an average of 25% in the rest of the countries considered. The 
easiest answer is that they tend to be non-employed rather than employed part-time: and 
indeed female employment rates during 1994-99 are on average 41% in southern Europe and 
60% in the rest of the sample, while the difference in male employment rate is not as 
pronounced. But what is probably less known is the use of other forms of employment across 
Europe, characterized by relatively flexible hours of work. The first of these is self-
employment, a category in which fall 18.3% of employed women in southern Europe, and 
only 7.2% of employed women in the rest of countries. The second one is unpaid work in the 
family business, which again concerns 7.3% of employed women in southern Europe and 
only 1% of women in other countries. 
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Table 1  
Summary statistics on male and female employment 
 
UK SWE FIN DEN GER NET BEL LUX AUT IRE FRA ITA SPA POR GRE
Males
Part-time                               
                                 
                             
                               
3.3 3.8 3.8 2.8 1.7 4.8 2.5 1.8 2.1 7.6 4.3 4.5 2.6 1.4 6.0
Involuntary  part-time
 
24.7 n.a. 28.9 20.4 8.9 13.5 40.9 27.3 18.5 66.0 48.3 26.8 44.6 32.8 43.8
On  temporary  job 7.4 6.2 12.9 12.2 8.3 8.2 7.8 4.6 7.9 13.5 8.8 12.0 34.9 19.6 22.0
Involuntary  temporary  job 45.4 54.8 74.1 54.3 16.9 41.8 77.3 n.a. 34.8 64.7 n.a. 51.8 74.8 42.3 74.2
Females                 
                               
                               
                             
                               
               
Part-time 30.2 18.1 9.5 17.0 22.8 45.2 26.9 21.0 24.6 29.2 21.6 21.8 15.4 8.7 15.9
Involuntary  part-time
 
7.3 n.a. 32.5 15.5 5.5 7.8 19.3 8.1 9.8 18.4 40.9 21.0 36.0 36.5 43.6
On  temporary  job 9.6 7.6 18.2 11.9 9.8 14.3 13.7 7.4 10.3 22.7 10.5 14.6 40.7 22.3 23.9
Involuntary  temporary  job
 
30.2 64.8 78.6 57.1 21.3 32.8 70.7 n.a. 38.9 49.6 n.a. 46.7 74.7 41.2 74.4
Notes. All figures reported are %. Definition of variables: part-time: normally working less than 30 hours in their main job, as a % of the total number of employees; involuntary part-time: 
whose main reason for working part-time is that they wanted but they could not find a full-time job, as a % of part-time employees; on temporary contract: holding a fixed-term contract or no 
contract at all, as a % of the total number of employees; involuntary temporary job:  whose main reason for holding a temporary contract is that they wanted but could not find a permanent 
job, as a % of temporary employees. The information on reason for part-time work is not available for Sweden. The information on reason for temporary work is not available for 
Luxembourg and France. Source and sample: ECHPS, 1994-1999, employees aged 16-64 (rows 1-3 and 5-7) and Eurostat 1999, employees aged 25-49 (rows 4 and 8).
                               
             
  
Table 2 
Female versus male employment characteristics: Differential effects  
 
  UK                              SWE FIN DEN GER NET BEL LUX AUT IRE FRA ITA SPA POR GRE
Incidence of part-time work 
Single,  no  kids                               
                               
                               
.055*** .061*** .015* .043*** .042*** .091*** .071*** .022*** .056*** .056*** .059*** .073*** .045*** .032*** .030*** 
Married,  no  kids .235*** .138*** .034*** .152*** .297*** .457*** .213*** .241*** .166*** .204*** .168*** .130*** .093*** .056*** .067***
Married,  with  kids .501*** .220*** .077*** .136*** .314*** .794*** .228*** .367*** .252*** .281*** .165*** .135*** .131*** .040*** .095***
Incidence of involuntary part-time work 
Single, no kids   .029**  -  .084  -.009  -.044  .018  .052  -  .013  -.081**  .193***  .067**  .063  .128**  .132** 
Married,  no  kids                        -.145*** - .002 .031 -.044 -.068***  -.185** - .032 -.452***  .139**  -.185***  -.213*** -.017 -.111
Married, with kids  -.237***  -  .010  -.127**  -.155***  -.090  -.44***  -  -.110**  -.695***  -.542***  -.068  -.420**  .558**  -.073 
Incidence of temporary work 
Single,  no  kids                                 
                               
                               
.002 .014* .048** .020 .001 -.008 .039** -.002 .017** .046*** .004 .020** .055*** .024** .025***
Married,  no  kids .009* .001 .034** -.022** -.003 .055*** .032** .017 .01 .142*** .044*** .014** .103*** .044*** .040**
Married,  with  kids .027* .034 .014 .024 -.035 .011 .071** .025 .021 .102** .017 -.007 .051 .023 .008
Notes. The figures reported are differences between females’ and males’ predicted probabilities of working part-time, being an involuntary part-timer and working on a temporary job for the 
demographic groups listed in the first column. The figures are based on estimates of probit models including: one gender dummy, two dummies for marital or cohabitation status (interacted with 
gender), the presence of kids aged 0-2, 3-5, 6-10 and 11-15 respectively (interacted with gender), age and its square, 2 education dummies, 9 occupation dummies, 2 industry dummies, one dummy 
for public sector and year dummies. No results are reported for Sweden and Luxembourg on involuntary part-time, due to missing information and small sample size respectively. Significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. Source: ECHPS. 
  
 
 Table 3:  
Job satisfaction on part-time and temporary contracts 
 
  UK                            FIN DEN GER NET BEL LUX AUT IRE FRA ITA SPA POR GRE
(1) Overall job satisfaction 
Part-time .154*** -.178*          .191* -.093 -.065 -.159* .412 -.058 -.128** .026 -.114** -.167*** -.161* -.204***
Part-time * F 
 
.038 .032  -.094  .111 .123** .220** -.388 .144  .045 -.057 .009 .064 -.233**  .136** 
Temp. -.217*** .000          -.147*** -.220*** -.125*** -.099* -.038 -.217*** -.301*** -.106*** -.449*** -.257*** -.353*** -.715***
Temp * F  .028 .079  .196***  .071 .055 .111 -.039 .014  .140** .015 .078* .015 .006  .040 
No.  Obs.            24013 7819 9092 7561 19491 8734 1770 14095 10017 20781 23785 21208 20621 12030
(2) Satisfaction with earnings
Part-time -.054 -.152*        .220** -.061 -.061 .005 -.399 .017 -.016 -.131*** -.357*** -.369*** -.415***  -.383***
Part-time * F 
 
.234*** -.016  .001  .055 .090* .044 .439 .006  -.050 .093* .151*** .253*** .000  .129* 
Temp. -.305*** -.171***  -.232***  -.206*** -.202*** -.145*** -.022 -.109**  -.160*** .007 -.333*** -.213*** -.124***  -.446*** 
Temp * F  -.007 .064  .206***  .177** .106** .083 .036 -.065  .106* -.149*** .085** .059* -.044  .037 
No.  Obs.            16259 7818 9175 7559 19448 8792 1770 14079 10011 20797 23781 21250 20614 12037
(3) Satisfaction with type of job
Part-time .005 -.129          .249** -.069 -.135*** -.028 -.040 -.003 -.098 .041 -.007 -.053 .065 .078
Part-time * F 
 
.017 -.053  -.167  -.007 .056 .079 .139 .042  -.019 -.034 .017 -.032 -.345***  .039 
Temp. -.181*** -.025    -.129**  -.112** -.122*** -.032 .031 -.154***  -.321*** .000 -.350*** -.194*** -.250***  -.590***
Temp * F  .028 .016  .177**  .060 .000 .117 .153 -.021  .091 .031 .077* -.069** .008  .150*** 
No. Obs.  26353 7812  9174  7548 19486 8781 1766 14077  9996 20801 23777 21254 20617  12037 
(4)  Satisfaction with working hours 
Part-time    .040 -.299***                         
     
                             
-.057 .026 .069 .082 -.149 .403*** -.100 .150** .177*** -.095 -.185** .326***
Part-time * F 
 
.407***  -.040  .529*** 
 
.299**  .229***  .307*** 
 
.591  -.137  .343***  -.011  .072  .154**  -.107  .124* 
Temp. -.037 .036 -.041  -.143***  -.006 -.001 .113  -.127***  -.226***  -.001  -.336***  -.190***  -.104***  -.537***
Temp * F  -.083*  -.098  -.143*  .145*  -.122**  .010  -.078  -.094  -.081  -.144**  .063  -.032  -.004  .086* 
No.  Obs. 26354 7818 9166 7550 19486 8773 1766 14077 9972 20801 23741 21240 20617 12037
(5)  Satisfaction with job security 
Part-time    .133** -.139                         
                     
                             
-.102 -.054 -.109** -.036 -.08 -.058 -.072 -.037 -.175*** -.305*** -.253*** -.118**
Part-time * F 
 
-.017  .091  .040  .209  .066  .047  .174  -.036  -.029  -.012  .035  .232***  .084  .167** 
Temp. -.845***  -1.033***  -.985*** -.523*** -1.095*** -.730*** -.819***  -.535*** -1.208*** -1.106*** -1.122*** -1.206*** -.934*** -1.337***
Temp * F  -.068  -.326***  -.265***  -.185**  -.127**  -.065  .404*  -.322***  -.155***  -.369***  .069  -.104***  -.136***  -.099** 
No.  Obs. 26226 7806 9169 7558 19440 8782 1769 14080 9995 20789 23782 21255 20613 12037
 
Notes. The figures reported are the coefficients obtained from ordered probit regressions for levels of subjective job satisfaction. The estimated equations also include: one gender dummy,  
two dummies for marital or cohabitation status (interacted with gender), the presence of kids aged 0-2, 3-5, 6-10 and 11-15 respectively (interacted with gender), age and its square, 2 
education dummies, 9 occupation dummies, 2 industry dummies, one dummy for public sector and year dummies. No results are reported for Sweden as information on job satisfaction is not 
available. Significance at 1%, 5% and 10% is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. Source: ECHPS. CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
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